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Abstract
Command and control at the operational level must be focused on developing the means and methods to effectively counter the enemy in multiple dimensions simultaneously while integrating with other joint and coalition forces and agencies. The five basic principles for planning airspace control provide the JFMCC with a framework from which a successful supporting role in the IAMD mission may be executed. First, interoperability issues, though not necessarily solvable, should be considered and compensation made at the operational level. Next, in the consideration of mass and timing, effort should be made by the operational commander to maintain focus on higher level planning and avoid descending into tactical execution. Unity of effort, the ultimate goal of joint operations, can best be achieved when commanders take the time to develop personal relationships to facilitate trust and cooperation at all echelons of command. Integrated planning cycles are necessary for successful mission execution; the Navy's MHQ with MOC concept provides the maritime operational commander with the tools needed for effective joint integration leading to overall unity of effort. Finally, the operational commander must be prepared to continue successful mission execution when conditions in the combat environment degrade. In sum, the five basic principles of planning airspace control: interoperability, mass and timing, unity of effort, integrated planning cycles, and degraded operations each contain concepts that, when regarded as a whole, offer a sound basis for joint IAMD operations.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout history new technologies and capabilities have changed the conduct of warfare. Some technologies such as the steam engine, long-range (rifled) weaponry, and wireless telegraphy dramatically increased potential speed and lethality of a military force. In the modern era new technologies have produced weapons such as cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and highly capable fighter and bomber aircraft as well as the weapons systems to counter these threats. "Technological developments combined with tactical innovation can bring about fundamental change in fighting capabilities." 1 These improved capabilities may be undermined if no thought is given to implementation. In order to effectively integrate new capabilities, the objectives need to be considered at all three levels of war -strategic, operational, and tactical. Traditionally, the Navy has succeeded in executing national strategy and training its men and women to be excellent tacticians. It is the operational level of war that has been the focus in recent years, specifically, developing sound doctrine and joint force integration.
Theater missile defense is an area of particular concern for the operational 
BACKGROUND
Defining operational level supported and supporting roles is often a difficult task.
There are four basic types of support outlined in joint doctrine: general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support. General support is given to the force as a whole while mutual support is given by two forces in relation to each other and the common enemy.
Direct support requires one force to support another in response to a specific request for assistance and authorizes the supporting force to respond directly to the supported force.
Finally, close support requires the supporting force to closely integrate and coordinate actions with the supported force due to proximity of targets or objectives. Tactical control (TACON) -Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. (JP 1-02, p 533) Mission type order -1. An order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. An order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. ( Typically, the JFMCC is assigned RADC duties in support of the JFACC/AADC.
Integrated air and missile defense is a complicated mission in which the supported/supporting roles must be thoroughly explained and agreed upon to avoid command and control seams which could negatively affect friendly forces. The question is how can the JFMCC best support the JFACC in IAMD while still achieving the maritime operational objectives.
Although command and control for IAMD is complicated, there is no need to develop new and complex processes to deal with it. The key is to use existing processes and to keep the planning and execution as simple as possible. To this aim, the JFMCC can best exercise the supporting role in IAMD using existing processes and expanding and adhering to the five basic principles for planning airspace control: interoperability, mass and timing, unity of effort, integrated planning cycles, and degraded operations.
DISCUSSION
The five basic principles for planning airspace control (Figure 2 ) can be expanded to encompass missile defense both within an area of responsibility (AOR) and across AOR boundaries. Due to space constraints and to maintain an operational focus, the principles of interoperability and mass and timing will only be discussed in a perfunctory manner as they pertain to integrated air and missile defense operational planning. Interoperability planning should take into account differences in equipment, personnel requirements, and differences in service terminology. Interoperability issues are not generally solvable by operational level commanders. Typically technology, funding, service doctrine, and acquisition processes will need to be addressed to fully eliminate a lack of interoperability. For the JFMCC, it is important to understand that some assets, especially AEGIS, may need to be dual tasked to achieve both maritime objectives and to provide sufficient support to the JFACC for IAMD. perception that the JFACC is not responsive or readily accessible. 21 The JFMCC must avoid attaching this type of perception to the maritime operational command. A strong personal relationship between the JFMCC and JFACC based on mutual respect and shared understanding of objectives will facilitate effective command and control of the IAMD mission at the operational level.
The fourth principle for planning airspace control, integrated planning cycles, is one the Navy has only recently begun to address. The Navy has a "rich culture of operational freedom" 22 and inter-service cooperation at all three levels of war. However, since WWII, there has been little opportunity for the Navy to plan and execute major operations.
As a result, the operational art and C2 capabilities associated with command at the maritime operational level have not had the opportunities to evolve and adapt to the modern operational environment. The maritime headquarters with maritime operations center (MHQ with MOC) is focused on defining and developing operational-level headquarters around the globe with some degree of baseline commonality.
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The MHQ with MOC "…represents the nexus of joint and Navy transformation initiatives, flexible and efficient manner. In IAMD, a high degree of centralization during execution may prevent a tactical level commander from successfully intercepting an enemy missile, especially in a degraded communications environment. When command and control is too centralized, it "does not leave any room for maneuver, either in execution or result, or in terms of time, timing, and duration." 27 In contrast, decentralized command and control "allows greater flexibility for adapting rapidly to changing battlefield situations, dealing with unforeseen problems, and exploiting fleeting opportunities." 28 Further, it is important that the concept of command by negation, a form of decentralized execution unique to the Navy, be observed in the execution of the IAMD mission. 29 Integrated air and missile defense is a mission that may have only minutes to react to an event, certainly not enough time to communicate up and down the chain of command, requesting permissions and delivering authoritative orders. Command by negation is a principle the Navy has used successfully for many years and is well suited for executing commander's intent during IAMD operations in a degraded environment.
CONCLUSIONS
The debate over supported/supporting command roles in relation to integrated air and missile defense has gone on for years and will continue in the future. The answer, for now, is that the JFMCC will act in a supporting role to the JFACC in the execution of the integrated air and missile defense mission. As ballistic missile proliferation increases, the demands on IAMD assets will also increase. Simply possessing a capability without effective and efficient means or methods to implement that capability is not a constructive or positive way 27 Milan N. Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, Ibid, p X-21. 29 NWP 3-32, p 1-7.
to operate as a joint force. Command and control at the operational level must be focused on developing the means and methods to effectively counter the enemy in multiple dimensions simultaneously while integrating with other joint and coalition forces and agencies. The five basic principles for planning airspace control provide the JFMCC with a framework from which a successful supporting role in the IAMD mission may be executed. First, interoperability issues, though not necessarily solvable, should be considered and compensation made at the operational level. Next, in the consideration of mass and timing, effort should be made by the operational commander to maintain focus on higher level planning and avoid descending into tactical execution. Unity of effort, the ultimate goal of joint operations, can best be achieved when commanders take the time to develop personal relationships to facilitate trust and cooperation at all echelons of command. Integrated planning cycles are necessary for successful mission execution; the Navy's MHQ with MOC concept provides the maritime operational commander with the tools needed for effective joint integration leading to overall unity of effort. Finally, the operational commander must be prepared to continue successful mission execution when conditions in the combat environment degrade. In sum, the five basic principles of planning airspace control:
interoperability, mass and timing, unity of effort, integrated planning cycles, and degraded operations each contain concepts that, when regarded as a whole, offer a sound basis for joint IAMD operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to be successful in the execution of the IAMD mission, effective integration to prevent command and control seams must be the focus of operational commanders.
Whether an event spans a single area of responsibility (AOR) or crosses multiple AORs, the with a corresponding decrease in cooperation and, ultimately, a failure to achieve unity of effort.
In addition to those recommendations discussed above, overall unity of effort in the IAMD mission may be achieved by instituting a maritime air defense commander (MADC).
Rather than acting in a RADC role subordinate to the AADC, the JFMCC should act as a MADC in conjunction with the AADC, both subordinate to the joint force commander.
32 Figure 4 illustrates the proposed theater air defense plan (TADP) and related command structure. The MADC would be responsible for developing a maritime air defense plan (MADP) while the AADC would remain responsible 30 Vego, Joint Operational Warfare, Ibid, p X-51. 32 The MADC should not be confused with the carrier strike group air defense commander who may act as a maritime sector air defense commander (MSADC). JFACC/AADC may be many miles (and time zones) away from the operations area. 34 In a peacetime environment, the distance is not a cause for alarm and operations may be executed successfully from a distance. The proposed command structure will also facilitate the use of decentralized command and control (C2), specifically, command by negation. In combat, especially with a near peer competitor, communications lines may be unavailable making the distance insurmountable.
"In decentralized C2, dependence on communications is generally greatly reduced. Reaction time is also considerably shortened, because subordinate commanders are allowed to act without constantly asking for advice and consent from their superiors.
In the case of heavy overload or even total breakdown of communications, lowercommand echelons are better prepared to act on their own initiative than in a highly centralized C2."
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The TADP, developed with the coordination and cooperation of the MADC and AADC, may be successfully implemented by either commander. A TADP would aid in preventing command and control seams while contributing to overall unity of effort.
To aid the JFMCC/MADC in integrating with the JFACC/AADC, a competent liaison element is required. The current opinion is that " interface in the targeting process via collaborative tools provides for greater visibility into joint targeting for the MOC and the maritime commanders, closer access to commanders' targeting guidance and priorities for MOC targeting personnel, and reduction of NALE/LNO requirements and footprint at other joint commands." 
